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“AND PALATE CALL JUDICIOUS”: PARADISE LOST 
AND THE QUESTION OF TASTE
BY ERIC B. SONG
According to the third chapter of Genesis, when Eve “saw that the 
tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree 
to be desired to make one wise, she took the fruit thereof, and did 
eat” (Gen. 3:6).1 The biblical account lists three related but discrete 
motivations for Eve’s transgression: the apparent wholesomeness of 
the fruit as food, the visual attractiveness of the tree, and the allure 
of transgressive knowledge. In Paradise Lost, John Milton demands 
from his readers a subtler consideration of the interplay between 
perception, pleasure, and knowledge. At the initial moment of the 
Fall, Milton describes how
        Eve
Intent now wholly on her taste, naught else
Regarded, such delight till then, as seemed,
In fruit she never tasted, whether true 
Or fancied so, through expectation high
Of knowledge, nor was godhead from her thought. 
Greedily she engorged without restraint,
And knew not eating death.2
Although these lines conclude with the emphatic lesson that Eve 
“knew not eating death,” they also complicate any straightforward 
understanding of her error. Eve’s experience of the fruit overwhelms 
her regard for anything else; her attention becomes solipsistic, directed 
not necessarily on the fruit but rather on her own delight. The source 
of this delight remains uncertain. The phrase “whether true or fancied 
so” invites the reader to wonder whether the fruit is genuinely, intrin-
sically delicious or whether expectations of godlike knowledge make 
the fruit seem delicious in Eve’s wayward experience.
What might it mean to decide that Eve is wrong to taste the fruit 
as delicious, or that she tastes the fruit as being more delicious than 
it really is? Such questions may seem trivial given all that is at stake 
in the mythic narrative. Yet Paradise Lost announces a concern for 
the taste of the fruit in its opening lines:
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Of man’s first disobedience, and the fruit
Of that forbidden tree, whose mortal taste
Brought death into the world, and all our woe[.]
              (PL, 1.1–3)
This opening signals the centrality of disobedience against God, but 
it also emphasizes the physical vessel and the sensuous experience of 
the Fall. The taste of the fruit is, of course, inaccessible for Milton 
and for his readers—not only because Adam and Eve were the only 
two people supposedly to taste of it, but also because language cannot 
transmit bodily experiences directly. Partly because this question 
of taste remains unanswerable, it helps to advance Milton’s poetic 
investigation of truth and experience. Central Miltonic concerns 
converge upon the taste of the forbidden fruit: the way rational choice 
is expressed in or distorted by a sensuous world, and what we should 
do when our curiosity encounters the limits of knowledge.
This essay begins by advancing two linked arguments concerning 
the taste of the fruit in Paradise Lost—or, more accurately, concerning 
the disparity between the real taste of the fruit and what the fruit 
tasted like (to Eve and then to Adam). First, I argue that the nature of 
Milton’s theodicy explains why the poem piques the reader’s curiosity 
about the fruit but then thwarts any decisive judgment concerning its 
true taste. Milton writes of a world in which a single deity has created 
human bodies and all the objects they encounter; a verdict concerning 
proper versus errant pleasure should be available. Yet taste registers a 
possibility that generates unease across Milton’s writings: God himself 
may take sensory pleasure in sacrifice, culminating in the death of his 
Son. When it comes to the origins of transgressive human delight, I 
argue, Milton avoids imagining God’s absolute judgment in order to 
shield the reader from the unhappy possibility of a sensuous or vora-
cious deity. The taste of the fruit remains open to human speculation 
as part of God’s redemptive plan—or, at least, to render this redemp-
tive plan more palatable. 
Yet the lesson of Paradise Lost concerning taste does not reduce to 
de gustibus non est disputandum, the maxim that teaches that there is 
no useful debate when it comes to the vagaries of taste. Intersubjective 
communication and judgment must remain viable despite a kernel 
of indecipherability. The question of taste, I go on to argue, makes 
particularly evident how a gendered hierarchy is called upon to make 
judgment possible in the absence of certainty. Before the Fall, the 
episode of Raphael’s visit and repast reveals Eve’s conflicted position 
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as an object of delight and as a thoughtful subject who must evaluate 
others’ tastes. The hierarchy of reason over sensuousness is gendered 
in a way that enjoins Adam to maintain husbandly superiority over 
his wife. Yet the resistance of taste to certainty helps to expose the 
gendering of this hierarchy as a tenuous fiction. After the Fall, Adam 
draws attention away from the fact that he has also eaten of the fruit 
by putting himself in the role of evaluating Eve’s taste. This posture 
of judgment, however, is a ruse or screen that allows Adam to uphold 
male superiority while also expressing newly lustful desires for his 
wife. Insofar as the ending of Paradise Lost is redemptive, it must 
restore the conditions of communication from this kind of corrupt 
judgment. Yet the poem ends not by overcoming a gendered hierarchy 
but rather by holding out a rarified version of it as the way to foster 
mutual understanding between two different subjects.
My reading of Paradise Lost takes part in recent scholarly conversa-
tions about the histories of food, taste, and eating, and about the early 
modern sensorium more generally.3 Like much of this scholarship, my 
essay attends to bodily phenomena both as historically specific and as a 
meaningful link between past and present experiences. The final section 
of this essay looks forward to suggest that Milton’s idiosyncratic but 
influential religious vision offers a divided lesson for modern thought, 
especially for the philosophical transition from taste to aesthetics. 
This lesson may not register within Edmund Burke’s theistic empiri-
cism—which grounds the possibility of universal standards of taste 
on a single Creator—but it speaks to the problems that beset the 
Kantian project of rational universalism. On the one hand, by leaving 
questions of taste open-ended for theological reasons, Milton’s poetry 
anticipates the transition from a model of taste rooted in the Creator 
to a mode of aesthetic judgment rooted in the subject. On the other 
hand, Paradise Lost transmits to future thinking a myth of gender 
difference as a way to establish intersubjective knowledge over and 
above subjective caprice. Questions of good taste, of good knowledge, 
and of the common good continue to be linked together; Paradise Lost 
can help us account for the ways we have imagined the problem of 
taste as it relates to rational evaluation and shared judgment.
******
In the description of Eve eating the forbidden fruit, Milton’s narra-
tive intrusion—“such delight till then, as seemed, / In fruit she never 
tasted”—gestures toward a logic of vitiated taste (emphasis added). 
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Perhaps only a corrupted palate would take delight in something God 
has prohibited. Yet a verdict concerning the basis of delight proves 
to be more difficult than a verdict concerning choice. Whatever Eve 
believes or has been led to believe, she is making the wrong decision 
by disobeying God. It remains less clear what it would mean for Eve’s 
taste to be vitiated at the exact moment of the Fall, if not moments 
before it. Such questions threaten to become unhelpfully scholastic: 
how quickly can a demon dance on the tip of a taste bud? Yet Milton 
underscores the interpretive difficulty involved. When the narrator 
adds, “whether true / Or fancied so,” it is slightly ambiguous whether 
he is talking about true versus fancied delight (as the sense suggests) 
or true versus fancied fruit (as proximity suggests). The faint sugges-
tion that we are again comparing this fruit with Hesperian fables 
reminds us that we will never know what it is really like to taste of 
this fruit. According to the more overt meaning, unfallen Eve has 
already fantasized about eating fruit more delicious than the accept-
able varieties in Eden. 
Eve has done so in an earlier dream implanted (or inspired) by 
Satan. In sleep, Eve had discovered that her appetite for the forbidden 
fruit could overwhelm rational choice: “I, methought, / Could not but 
taste” (PL, 5.85–86). Eve’s narration only implies that she ate the fruit 
through a negative construction qualified with a “methought.” Such 
uncertainty befits the fantastical and subjective nature of a dream; 
neither we nor Adam have any direct access to Eve’s dream content. 
In Adam’s subsequent evaluation, the errant work of the “lesser 
faculties that serve / Reason as chief” should not cause Eve too much 
concern as long as she exercises her rational choice in her waking life 
(PL, 5.101–2). When Eve falls in reality, however, she not only becomes 
culpable of volitional wrongdoing but also experiences an intermingling 
of the various senses that beleaguers reason. 
Eve does deliberate before eating the fruit, but the poetic narra-
tion in book 9 prefaces this deliberation with an account of the fruit’s 
synesthetic allure. As the serpent’s speech continues to ring in Eve’s 
ears, the noontime hour wakes in her
An eager appetite, raised by the smell
So savory of that fruit, which with desire,
Inclinable now grown to touch or taste,
Solicited her longing eye; yet first
Pausing a while, thus to herself she mused.
    (PL, 9.740–44)
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Here, too, Eve’s motivations prove more fluid than the third chapter 
of Genesis suggests. Milton appeals to but challenges the hierarchy 
of the senses—a familiar hierarchy that persists from antiquity to 
contemporary thought. Whereas vision and hearing “appear compara-
tively detached from experiences that are phenomenally subjective,” as 
Carolyn Korsmeyer puts it, taste “requires perhaps the most intimate 
congress with the object of perception.”4 In Milton’s account, the 
lower senses of smell and taste introduce impulses that imperil Eve’s 
judgment. Eve’s choice does remain free insofar as these lower senses 
filter first through the higher ones and then through reason. Only after 
being swayed through the sound of deceptive words and then through 
a desirous eye will Eve succumb to the temptation to see as the gods 
do. Yet rational deliberation is described as a pause within a chain of 
sensuous experiences; the phrase “yet first” conveys the impression 
that Eve’s reasoning is a mere delay within the process that the lower 
senses have initiated.
The relationship between Eve’s dream and the waking Fall carries 
theodicial implications. The reader is confronted with another case 
in which the Fall seems, ominously, to have occurred before the fact. 
In the conceptual space between an involuntary Fall (“Could not 
but taste”) and an unencumbered rational choice arises the difficult 
question of “true / Or fancied” delight. If Milton’s God is emphatic 
about the impropriety of human actions, he offers no transcendent 
verdict concerning Eve’s delight in the taste of the forbidden fruit. 
The mysterious source of her pleasure adds a specific dimension to 
the existing problem of divine foreknowledge. Knowing that God 
designed an interdicted fruit to taste a certain way would raise more 
questions about his foreknowledge. It might seem curiously futile for 
God to make a fruit delicious only to ban the eating of it; it might seem 
downright perverse for God to make it delicious because he knows 
ahead of time that it will be eaten against his command.
Paradise Lost deflects questions about the divinely ordained taste 
of the forbidden fruit: after the Fall, the devils are transformed into 
serpents condemned to eat “delusive” fruit that looks appealing but 
turns into ashes once in their mouths (PL, 10.563). In this latter case, 
God has deliberately designed a fruit so that it will deceive his enemies 
as a form of just retribution. Eve’s earlier taste of the forbidden fruit, 
however, blurs the lines between legitimate and corrupt experi-
ence in a way that this later parody cannot fully settle. At the crux 
between innocent and fallen human experience, the taste of the fruit 
cannot simply be allegorized as the deceptive delightfulness of moral 
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corruption. The account of delusive fruit in book 10 does confirm that 
the Creator is fully capable of eliminating or manipulating the gap 
between perception and reality. Eve’s experience, by contrast, leaves 
us in the realm of imperfect judgment and communication—the realm 
that the poetic narrator occupies.
The complexity of Eve’s delight contrasts with Adam’s subsequent act 
of forbidden eating. Nature itself responds with trembling and weeping 
“at completing of the mortal sin” (PL, 9.1003), yet the description of 
Adam’s experience is peculiarly flat: “while Adam took no thought, 
/ Eating his fill” (PL, 9.1004–5). Kristen Poole has offered a way to 
understand this contrast between Eve greedily engorging and Adam 
merely eating his fill. Poole argues that Paradise Lost bears the imprints 
of Origen’s early claim that humanity fell partly due to spiritual satiety. 
Just as an excess of food causes a surfeit, a soul’s satiety in divine 
presence triggers a turning away from God. Origen’s teaching had, in 
the fourth century, been rebutted by Gregory of Nyssa, who argues 
for the difference between physical satiety and a soul’s bottomless 
capacity for God. In Poole’s reading, Paradise Lost offers “an abrasion 
of theological positions”—between “the idealism of Gregory of Nyssa’s 
position (the soul grows continuously and perpetually . . . ) and the 
experiential realism of Origen’s position (human beings . . . can become 
overwhelmed with zealous excess).”5 In Milton’s retelling of the Fall 
and its causes, the avoidance of excess proves to be a strenuous task 
or even a paradoxical endeavor. Theological applications of satiety cast 
God as the highest object of human consumption, with inferior objects 
of physical consumption proving less or more acceptable. Eve’s delight 
in the fruit is clearly excessive and stimulates a satiety—not a fullness 
of God himself, as in Origen’s understanding, but rather of a chimerical 
godlike knowledge—that leads to fallenness. As Poole observes, Adam 
experiences a dangerous “overjoy” not over the taste of the fruit but 
rather over Eve; Adam’s challenge is to find an acceptable balance 
of desire and restraint when it comes to his feelings about his wife.6 
My own focus is less on excess and more on the pleasure that 
motivates consumption while thwarting restraint. Pleasure situates 
the Creator and humans in a more complex pattern of mutual activity 
than does a metaphor of consuming deity. The original temptation is 
not to consume too much of God, but rather to attempt to be like 
God through the act of eating. Paradise Lost celebrates forms of 
sensuousness, ranging from the lyrical to the olfactory to the erotic, 
as part of Edenic life. Innocent pleasure is a gift of the Creator to his 
creatures; insofar as humans are made in God’s likeness, such delight 
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is an experience that God has designed and comprehends. Yet when it 
comes to the taste of the forbidden fruit, Milton’s theodicy functions 
more coherently in the absence of divine judgment. Taste poses a chal-
lenge to Milton’s theodicy not only because it underscores questions 
about divine foreknowledge, but also because it points to questions 
about God’s own enjoyment. 
If satiety, as Poole suggests, is a key term in understanding the 
implications of human appetite, the related notion of satisfaction reveals 
how pleasure can pose a soteriological problem.7 In book 3 of Paradise 
Lost, God foresees the Fall and its implications. All of humanity will 
die unless “Some other able, and as willing, pay / The rigid satisfac-
tion, death for death” (PL, 3.211–12). Recent scholarship on Milton’s 
soteriology has raised questions about his views of and attitudes toward 
substitutionary sacrifice.8 Yet these particular lines, as C. A. Patrides 
argued in an earlier influential essay, clearly do articulate a widespread 
Protestant view of atonement in which Christ’s death serves as a neces-
sary sacrifice.9 Milton’s God invokes satisfaction in its abstract, legal, 
and impersonal sense; death is required not to satisfy God, per se, but 
rather to achieve an adequate expiation. Yet satisfying the demands of 
pleasure has been a motivating principle for God as Creator. Earlier in 
the same heavenly colloquy, God describes why he has given humans 
free choice. God first describes an epistemological imperative: without 
freedom, obedient creatures could offer no “proof” of their sincerity 
(PL, 3.103). A few lines later, however, God mentions the “pleasure” 
he derives from obedience (PL, 3.107). Such pleasure is not explicitly 
sensuous, yet it does suggest that God’s delight motivates his creative 
acts; by this principle, we may be sensuous but freely rational beings 
only so that we can be suitable objects of God’s enjoyment. Yet Milton 
works to contain such a possibility, using an abstract and depersonalized 
language of satisfaction to disavow the possibility of a God indecorously 
pleased by sacrifice.
In the earlier poem “Upon the Circumcision,” Milton had worked 
to strip away the appetitive dimensions of satisfaction in matters of 
atonement. The younger Milton describes “that great covenant which 
we still transgress / Entirely satisfied.”10 Here, too, Jesus is described 
as dying not to satisfy God but rather to achieve a legal satisfaction. 
“Upon the Circumcision” and Paradise Lost both bear witness to the 
fact that, as William Kerrigan has put it, “Milton could never write with 
customary strength about the Sacrifice because he felt its intolerable 
illogic more profoundly than a Crashaw.”11 The contrast that Kerrigan 
proposes, between Milton and his contemporary Richard Crashaw, 
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allows us to discern how Milton assiduously avoids a view of atone-
ment in which Christ dies to satisfy God’s appetite. In “Our Lord in his 
Circumcision to his Father,” Crashaw ventriloquizes the infant Jesus: 
To thee these first fruits of my growing death 
(For what else is my life?) lo I bequeath. 
Tast this, and as thou lik’st this lesser flood 
Expect a Sea, my heart shall make it good.12
Crashaw describes the infant Jesus in the midst of his circumcision 
whetting his Father’s appetite for blood. This macabre scenario makes 
sense within the context of Crashaw’s poetry, in which the transmis-
sion of bodily fluids is a devotional act. For Milton, by contrast, a 
God who relishes blood would prove repugnant. Such a God would 
resemble some of the rival deities that Milton decries as demonic. 
Moloch appears in Paradise Lost as a wicked god who demands child 
sacrifice; in Milton’s imagination more broadly, Saturn looms as a deity 
who devours his own offspring.13
Although Milton avoids describing atonement as the satisfaction of 
God’s appetite, Paradise Lost follows scriptural precedent in describing 
God’s olfactory delight.14 Genesis 8 tells us that “the LORD smelled 
a sweet savour” after Noah offers sacrifices (Gen. 8:21). Revelation 
provides a typological account of such pleasing aroma: “And the smoke 
of the incense, which came with the prayers of the saints, ascended 
up before God out of the angel’s hand” (Rev 8:4). In the account of 
Eve’s enticement, as we have seen, Milton describes how the lower 
senses of smell and taste work together. Yet the basic differences 
between taste and smell prove significant: the latter can be a much 
more passive act, as one can smell something without intending to do 
so. The scriptures suggest that God exercises more agency over his 
nostrils than do humans: “I will not smell the savour of your sweet 
odours,” God declares in Leviticus to describe the consequences 
of disobedience (Lev. 26:31). Yet such descriptions also emphasize 
the agency of God’s people to offer something pleasing. A God who 
receives pleasing aromas may be meaningfully different from a God 
who wants to devour.
On the morning of the Fall in Paradise Lost, nature and humans 
participate in a cycle of olfactory pleasure between Creator and 
creation. When the “humid flowers” of Eden 
         breathed
Their morning incense, when all things that breathe, 
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From the earth’s great altar send up silent praise 
To the creator, and his nostrils fill 
With grateful smell, forth came the human pair 
And joined their vocal worship to the choir. 
     (PL, 9.193–97)
Milton weaves between aural and olfactory senses in order to embed 
a startling suggestion. “Grateful smell” logically indicates the odor of 
gratitude expressed by creation, but it also serves as the only possible 
account of the delight that God takes in this aroma. Without such 
a suggestion, the reader is left with the merely factual declaration 
that the smell “his nostrils fill.” The idea of God being grateful to his 
creatures veers toward blasphemy and must register only faintly. Yet 
the relatively passive nature of olfaction allows for affective congress 
between a grateful creation and a God who receives its thanks with 
pleasure.
In a fallen world, however, sacrifice will be necessary to please God. 
Enabled by grace, Adam and Eve offer prayers that, once they reach 
Heaven, are “clad / With incense” (PL, 11.17–18). Assuming the role 
of intercessor, the Son describes these penitent prayers as “Fruits of 
more pleasing savour” than the literal fruit of Eden (PL, 11.26). This 
promotion of metaphorical over literal objects of delectation serves to 
limit God’s active pleasure in sacrifice. Afterwards, in Adam’s lesson 
about the fallen world, Abel is described as offering animal sacrifices 
that are by “propitious fire from heaven / Consumed with nimble 
glance, and grateful steam” (PL, 11.441–42). Milton invites the notion 
that Abel’s sacrifices are eaten by heaven but then corrects it, partly 
by transposing the biblical image of consuming fire onto the fourth 
chapter of Genesis, which provides no such imagery. The consumption 
that Milton describes is incendiary and appeals to the eye (“nimble 
glance”) rather than to the mouth. Milton then uses the word “grateful” 
again to suggest that sensory pleasure accommodates a shared experi-
ence between Creator and creation. The relative passivity of grateful 
olfaction allows Milton to describe divine appeasement without rein-
forcing the image of God as a devourer. Yet the way Milton weaves 
between these two senses—and the general fact that taste and smell 
are intimately connected—reveals how the possibility of an appetitive 
deity still lingers in the poem’s theological imagination.
Biblical and poetic accounts of divine pleasure raise questions 
about anthropomorphism. It remains fully possible that such language 
merely attempts to describe an otherwise incomprehensible God. As 
Lana Cable reminds us, a younger Milton had dared, in a polemical 
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context, to be far more emphatic about divine taste. In Of Reformation, 
Milton reimagines the biblical image of Christ spitting out lukewarm 
believers to describe how episcopacy produces devotion that “gives 
a vomit to God himself.”15 For Cable, this quotation serves as an 
example of how what “Milton really means” cannot be reduced to the 
meaning behind a bodily metaphor.16 Precisely through an indecorous 
description of God, Milton the iconoclast can shock “the idolatrous 
decorum of the lukewarm bishops.”17 As a polemicist, Milton widens 
the disparity between an anthropomorphic description of God and 
the higher reality of divinity in order to attack those who ostensibly 
engender debased devotion. Yet in Milton’s poetry, the possibility of 
divine pleasure may prove more challenging than divine disgust. The 
lingering idea of God’s gustatory satisfaction reveals one aspect of the 
predicament that Victoria Silver locates in Milton’s poetry. Silver argues 
that Milton’s writings consistently underscore the ineluctable disparity 
between “the divine nature (deity per se) and the divine image (deity 
as it accommodates itself toward us),” following Protestant elabora-
tions of the deus absconditus, the hidden and inscrutable deity.18 For 
Martin Luther and John Calvin, the appeal to an inaccessible deity 
thwarts the demands of rational theodicy and guards the mysteries 
involved in atonement. My own argument does not concern the general 
unknowability of Milton’s God but rather how a particular aspect of his 
unknowability translates into the indecipherability of human taste—at 
the very moment when eating promises a godlike form of knowledge. 
In Paradise Lost, the question of taste must not be pushed too far, for 
it ultimately reveals the disturbing possibility that the unknowability 
of God is merely a screen for the even unhappier possibility that we 
find God distasteful. 
******
If Eve’s delight in the fruit remains subjective in a way that resists 
unequivocal judgment, Paradise Lost still describes how free experi-
ences can be organized and evaluated hierarchically. When the angel 
Raphael visits Eden, he partakes of an earthly meal and talks exten-
sively about eating; angelic taste would seem to offer a useful middle 
ground between divine truth and human perception. Yet the episode 
of Raphael’s visitation underscores how the gendered hierarchy of 
Edenic life makes conflicting claims upon Eve: she is called to be 
an object of male delight but also a subject who must consider the 
perceptions, thoughts, and tastes of others. As Raphael encounters 
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Eve for the first time, the narrator emphasizes the latter’s innocent 
beauty and nakedness. Eve is
                     herself more lovely fair
Than wood-nymph, or the fairest goddess feigned
Of three that in Mount Ida naked strove[.] 
(PL, 5.380–82)
Milton subsequently reminds us that Eve is the object of sinless 
admiration; unlike the “sons of God” (PL, 5.447) who marry women 
out of desire in the sixth chapter of Genesis, Raphael feels a “Love 
unlibidinous” toward Eve (PL, 5.449). Yet by the end of this extended 
episode, the delight that Eve sparks becomes a source of concern or 
even contention. For Adam, Eve represents not only visual beauty but 
a synesthetic source of pleasure (“transported I behold, / Transported 
touch”) who is, at the same time, a rational subject (PL, 8.529–30). 
When Adam confesses that he has difficulty maintaining his husbandly 
superiority before Eve, Raphael admonishes him not to be unduly 
swayed by sexual congress. Raphael reinforces the alignment of mascu-
linity with reality and reason and of femininity with superficiality and 
corporeality. Yet Adam insists that Raphael has misunderstood and 
that the source of Eve’s seeming superiority is not merely erotic but 
rather derives from “all her words and actions” (PL, 8.602).
The way Eve motivates either innocent or potentially subversive 
delight thus frames the entirety of Raphael’s visitation. The angel’s 
participation in a noontime meal reveals more specifically how the ques-
tion of taste becomes intertwined with problems of desire, physicality, 
and beleaguered male ascendancy. When Raphael addresses Eve for 
the first time, he hails her as “mother of mankind” (PL, 5.388). The 
angel predicts that the world will grow
                    more numerous with [her] sons
Than with these various fruits the trees of God
Have heaped this table.
          (PL, 5.389–91)
This jarring simile likens future humans to edible crops. It is possible 
that the threat of a voracious deity registers faintly; Raphael does not 
specify for whom these fruit-like humans will be heaped up.19 Within 
the immediate context, Raphael’s simile more clearly suggests that 
the matter of eating coincides with sex and reproduction to define 
Eve’s conflicting status as a vehicle of reproduction but also as a privi-
leged subject. Eve should look forward to becoming the mother of 
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mankind—and, after the Fall, of the seed who will crush the serpent’s 
head—but only by accepting her secondary status as Adam’s likeness 
and helper. Raphael’s simile likens maternal Eve to a fertile tree while 
denying the fact that she plays an active, human role rather than a 
passive and arboreal one in “heap[ing]” the table before them.
By the time Raphael hails Eve, she has already been tasked with 
preparing a meal for the “heavenly stranger” (PL, 5.316). Eve deploys 
“hospitable thoughts intent / What choice to choose for delicacy best” 
(PL, 5.332–33). The phrase “choice to choose” registers the difficulty 
of knowing how to please an angelic palate; Eve’s decisions seem to 
have taken a second-order, reflexive turn whereby she reconsiders the 
kinds of choices she makes. Laura Lunger Knoppers observes that 
Milton channels his political thinking into his description of Eve’s 
culinary endeavors. Because her labor demands thoughtful attention, 
it “cultivates the civic virtues of temperance, reason, and choice.”20 
My narrower focus underscores the practical challenge that Eve faces 
in attempting to satisfy another’s sensibilities. In retrospect, a painful 
set of ironies converge on Eve’s task. Before Eve’s gustatory delight 
occasions the Fall (and heightens our own curiosity about her sensory 
experiences), she is called upon to imagine the tastes of others. The 
literal fruits of her work are compared to the fruits of her eventual 
childbearing; after the Fall, motherhood will be the way that Eve 
can restore her rightful place in redemptive history while remaining 
subjected to Adam. Eve, in other words, is called upon to work within 
and around the unknowability of others’ tastes, but she must continue 
to remain, at least in part, the object rather than subject of this 
mystery. When Eve goes on to experience a transgressive delight in 
the forbidden fruit, she becomes the object of our collective scrutiny 
in a way that Adam does not when he falls.
Adam, by contrast, plays the discursive role of host during Raphael’s 
visit. In this capacity, Adam is keenly curious to know whether earthly 
food will taste good to the angelic visitor. Adam describes how “our 
nourisher” (PL, 5.398) provides an earthly bounty “for food and for 
delight” (PL, 5.400) but then frets that the angel will experience it 
as “unsavoury food” (PL, 5.401). Although the ensuing colloquy gives 
the strong impression that Raphael enjoyed his meal, some ambiguity 
persists. The angel speculates that God has provided “new delights” 
that can compare with heaven’s, but he says this before tasting earthly 
food (PL, 5.431). After eating, Raphael speaks extensively about the 
nutritional value (physical and spiritual) of Edenic food; he says nothing 
about its taste or relative deliciousness. As Amy L. Tigner suggests, 
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Raphael may very well let his politeness slip when he praises his 
more heavenly customary fare, “Fruit of delicious vines, the growth of 
heaven” (PL, 5.635).21 Our inability to be absolutely certain that Raphael 
has enjoyed his earthly meal may seem like a trivial matter. Yet the 
slight doubt accommodated by the narrative plays into the overarching 
questions of taste as it relates to judgment and rational choice.
The indecipherability of taste opens onto the broader discrepan-
cies between Raphael’s advice and the complexities of human experi-
ence. As we have seen at the outset of this essay, the third chapter 
of Genesis lists three ways that the Tree of Knowledge enticed Eve: 
by offering good food, by pleasing her eye, and by promising godlike 
understanding. Raphael’s angelic perspective works to distinguish the 
registers of nutritious goodness, visual appeal, and knowledge. Eve is 
introduced as the primary object of visual allure in this episode; whole-
someness and knowledge converge upon food. In Raphael’s extended 
description of a monistic universe, eating becomes a pathway to spiri-
tual ascent: “All things proceed and up to [God] return” in a chain 
of consumption and digestive sublimation (PL, 5.470).22 Yet gustatory 
pleasure remains partly estranged from this pattern of nourishment. 
Although Raphael’s cosmology is expressed in terms that appeal to the 
senses (“last the bright consummate flower / Spirits odorous breathes” 
[PL, 5.481–82]), the angel emphasizes “nourishment” (PL, 5.483) and 
“corporal nutriments” while making no explicit mention of delightful 
taste (PL, 5.496). Raphael concludes his lesson about eating with an 
admonition to both Adam and Eve: 
                              Meanwhile enjoy
Your fill what happiness this happy state
Can comprehend, incapable of more.
    (PL, 5.503–5)
The language of filling and comprehending does suggest a prelapsarian 
union of eating, growth, and knowledge; this union contributes to the 
happiness of Edenic life. Yet Raphael’s warning about proper limits 
sharply qualifies his injunction to enjoy. Far from offering a celebration 
of pleasure and benefit harmonized together through acts of eating, 
Raphael’s lesson suggests the difficulty of maintaining a proper balance 
between them.
Raphael is not prudish about his own pleasures. His colloquy with 
Adam ends with a memorable description of angelic sex. Yet this 
conclusion underscores the differences between angelic and human 
experience. Raphael’s lessons about male superiority prove inadequate 
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to prevent Adam from joining his wife in sin. (As the argument to 
book 5—added by Milton for the 1668 printing of the poem—teaches, 
Raphael’s lessons are not meant to succeed but rather “to render man 
inexcusable”.23) Raphael’s lessons offer even less assistance to Eve 
as she goes on to confront a gustatory temptation—an interplay of 
sensory and cognitive experiences that the angel’s extended remarks 
about eating cannot fully anticipate. Looking back from Eve’s experi-
ence of the forbidden fruit, it is particularly meaningful that Adam 
and Raphael’s colloquy raise the stakes of eating to cosmological levels 
at the expense of practical knowledge. In book 5, Eve alone is tasked 
with acting on her limited speculations of the tastes of an alien visitor. 
Milton goes out of his way to describe Eve correcting Adam’s inaccurate 
assumptions about how food is prepared in Eden (see PL, 5.313–26). 
Raphael is, if anything, less aware of Eve’s culinary labors. The angel’s 
efforts to establish provisional boundaries between wholesomeness and 
delight jars with human experience, especially human experience at 
the threshold of innocence and fallenness. Raphael’s admonitions to 
limit pleasure—erotic pleasure and conjugal love in Adam’s case, the 
conjoined delights of eating and gaining knowledge in Eve’s—cannot 
contain human sensuousness and its effects on reason and knowledge.
When unfallen Adam is confronted by fallen Eve in book 9, the 
problem of his husbandly superiority and desire for his wife converges 
upon the question of taste. Adam has no firm basis on which to judge 
whether the fruit is genuinely delicious. After joining Eve in sin, Adam 
explicitly broaches this topic:
Eve, now I see thou art exact of taste,
And elegant, of sapience no small part,
Since to each meaning savour we apply,
And palate call judicious[.]
         (PL, 9.1017–20)
This judgment amounts to a travesty, one that the serpent has insinu-
ated into Eve’s mind and now Adam’s. The forbidden fruit has not 
conferred godlike vision; although Adam may now know good versus 
evil, he looks at Eve through “lascivious eyes” (PL, 9.1014). Yet it 
is still revealing what Adam, in his delusion, thinks his new godlike 
perspective offers, what he claims to experience through his altered 
vision. Adam’s new epistemological position turns him into something 
like a critic of his wife’s more directly physical sensibilities. Adam 
immediately goes on to confess his own experience of delight: “Much 
pleasure have we lost, while we abstained / From this delightful fruit” 
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(PL, 9.1022–23). Yet Adam’s sensuous pleasure contains a degree of 
cognitive evaluation; the use of the first-person plural heightens the 
sense that he has joined his wife in transgressive pleasure partly to 
confirm her experience. 
The emphasis on taste enacts a twist on the misogynistic teaching 
concerning male versus female knowledge in the first epistle to 
Timothy: “And Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived 
was in the transgression” (1 Tim. 2:14). Milton does adhere to Pauline 
(or pseudo-Pauline) teaching by having Adam choose to join Eve 
despite being fully aware of the consequences. Eve, by contrast, had 
been deceived by the serpent. Yet as we have seen, it remains unclear 
whether Eve’s palate had been deluded along with her knowledge. 
Subsequently, even though we know Adam falls undeceived, we 
remain unsure of the status of his taste—whether he has shared Eve’s 
delight in the taste of the forbidden fruit, or whether he affirms her 
taste insincerely to flatter her for his ulterior motives. If Adam were to 
have remained obedient to God, he should have let Eve’s taste remain 
indecipherable. In this sense, the reader’s lack of direct access to the 
taste of the fruit can be partially redeemed as wholesome; Adam’s 
example teaches us not to inquire too far about abstruse matters. Yet 
as fallen readers, we occupy the corruptible version of uncertainty. We 
are, in fact, products of Adam’s choice to join Eve and to replicate her 
act of tasting. After the Fall, the gendered division that has already 
manifested itself around food reemerges as a sharper split between 
sensuous experience and judgment. This splitting is part of the legacy 
of the Fall that Milton challenges his readers to negotiate. On the one 
hand, Milton works to undercut the position of male superiority that 
Adam expresses as critical detachment. Adam’s posture covers over a 
sense of inadequacy that existed even before the Fall, and his judg-
ment now amounts to sexually motivated flattery. On the other hand, 
we as readers have no access to any superior grounds for judgment. 
The question of taste reminds us that the desire to unite the accuracy 
of knowledge and the delight of the senses has been of a piece with 
the forbidden act: acquiring moral knowledge through eating. After 
the Fall, attempts to evaluate sensual experience may be deluded and 
crassly motivated. Milton’s God intends to save humanity from such 
a predicament, and yet by virtue of his redemptive plans, he remains 
silent about the judiciousness of Eve’s taste.
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******
In Paradise Lost, I have argued, taste shuttles Eve from innocence 
to fallenness while eluding absolute judgment. The partial indecipher-
ability of taste takes part in the broader unruliness of human experi-
ence, which a gendered hierarchy is called upon but fails to manage. 
In this closing section, I suggest that Milton’s divided lessons can speak 
meaningfully to subsequent developments in thinking about taste. In 
A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origins of Our Ideas of the Sublime 
and Beautiful, Burke repeatedly conscripts Milton’s poetry for the 
project of grounding universal standards of taste in the existence of a 
single Creator. Burke certainly does not heed the way Paradise Lost 
remains silent about God’s judgment when it comes to the most deci-
sive act of eating. Yet in retrospect, I argue, we can discern Milton’s 
challenge to this kind of theistic empiricism. I then describe Milton’s 
more roundabout relevance for the Kantian shift away from taste 
and toward aesthetics.24 Milton articulates a particular version of a 
religious worldview that continues to influence how we conceive the 
difficulties involved in the Enlightenment project of universality—even 
when belief in a Creator has become far less important in securing 
universal standards for judgment. I have no desire to argue that Milton 
prophetically forecasts the impossibility of an Enlightenment project. 
Rather, Milton’s poetry illustrates how gender difference has become 
embedded within cultural myth as a troubled way of imagining the 
problems that exist at the juncture of capricious individual experience 
and collective judgment.
As Denise Gigante observes, we can locate Milton at a moment 
when taste had not yet given way to aesthetics via British sentimen-
talism. That is, the broad use of the term taste still conflated the act 
of tasting food with other modes of judgment that would later come 
to be labeled aesthetic. Burke plays an early role in this intellectual 
transition; Immanuel Kant would come to play a much more decisive 
one. As Kant asks, “How might it have happened that the modern 
languages particularly have chosen to name the aesthetic faculty of 
judgement with an expression (gustus, sapor) which merely refers to a 
certain sense-organ (the inside of the mouth), and that the discrimina-
tion as well as the choice of palatable things is determined by it?”25 
Burke had conceded in his “Introduction on Taste” that “[t]he term 
Taste, like all other figurative terms, is not extremely accurate.”26 Yet 
he continues to use the term confidently, appealing to “the consent 
of all men in the metaphors which are taken from the sense of Taste” 
(PE, 14). Later, in a section on taste and smell, Burke argues for the 
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propriety of applying gustatory taste to other sensations: “This general 
agreement of the senses is yet more evident on minutely considering 
those of taste and smell. We metaphorically apply the idea of sweet-
ness to sights, and sounds” (PE, 100). Burke appeals to the traditional 
hierarchy of the senses only to uphold an analogy between the lower 
and the higher. 
Throughout the Enquiry, Burke relies on Milton’s poetry to furnish 
examples of the beautiful and the sublime. “We do not any where 
meet a more sublime description than this justly celebrated one of 
Milton,” Burke observes before quoting lines from Paradise Lost 
(PE, 57). Later, Milton is referred to simply as “[o]ur great poet” 
(PE, 65). Burke’s affinity for Milton’s theological and rationally stren-
uous poetry proves unsurprising. Although Burke does not explicitly say 
as much, Milton’s writings may serve not just as a source of examples 
but also as a precedent for a rational inquiry converging with praise of 
God. Burke imagines empiricist inquiry as functioning as something 
akin to devotional art: “If a discourse on the use of the parts of the 
body may be considered as an hymn to the Creator; the use of the 
passions, which are the organs of the mind, cannot be barren of praise 
to him” (PE, 44).
Milton’s poetry is also associated, although not strictly linked, 
with the application of the term taste to describe the whole range 
of sensory experiences and the cognitive evaluation of them. In 
the section immediately preceding the remarks on taste and smell, 
Burke describes music in a way that affirms the basic likeness of the 
different sensory experiences labeled as tastes. He suggests that “sweet 
or beautiful” are virtually synonymous ways to describe music and 
declares that “beautiful sounds agree with our descriptions of beauty 
in other senses” (PE, 99). Burke cites lines from Milton’s L’Allegro as 
his primary evidence, proclaiming that “no man had a finer ear” than 
Milton, none “with a happier manner of expressing the affections of 
one sense by metaphors taken from another” (PE, 99). The end of 
L’Allegro describes the ecstasy produced by the “linked sweetness” 
of musical sounds. It is likely a mere coincidence that Burke quotes 
Milton’s happy man welcoming “‘soft Lydian airs’” as a defense “‘against 
eating cares’” (PE, 99, italics in original). Burke relies on Milton’s 
description of sweet music and does not register any possibility of a 
clash between different senses. Yet even as a coincidence—or as an 
overlooked complication—this discordance is suggestive: even though 
music might be likened to sweetness, the higher artistic appeal to the 
ear is nonetheless set against a baser, metaphorical form of devouring. 
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Throughout the entire Enquiry, Burke ignores the Miltonic rationale 
for avoiding God’s judgment concerning taste. In this particular section, 
Burke relies selectively on one of Milton’s earlier poems rather than 
attending to the complex interaction among the senses in Paradise 
Lost. As we have seen, Milton’s rewriting of the Genesis myth describes 
the lower and higher senses as working together or at cross-purposes, 
engendering experiences that range from wholesome delight to the 
onset of corruption. 
In The Critique of Judgment, Kant praises Burke as “the foremost 
author” on the physiological bases of beauty and sublimity; Burke 
furnishes “psychological observations” that “are exceedingly fine 
and provide rich material for the favorite investigations of empirical 
psychology.”27 Yet Kant’s First Introduction to The Critique reveals such 
praise to be backhanded: empirical psychology has merely gathered 
“material for future empirical rules that are to be connected systemati-
cally” but “without trying to grasp these rules” (C, 427). Kant’s aesthetic 
philosophy seeks to be far more systematic than Burke had been in 
applying the term “taste” broadly. Taste does remain for Kant a partly 
suitable synecdoche for a faculty that is “not one of the understanding 
or reason”: “For even if someone lists all the ingredients of a dish, 
pointing out that I have always found each of them agreeable . . . I 
shall be deaf to all these reasons: I shall try the dish with my tongue 
and palate” (C, 148). The interplay between subjective experience and 
general validity should allow judgment to accommodate individual 
freedom. Taste remains a useful test case insofar as it underscores 
the necessity of freedom: “Taste lays claim merely to autonomy,” Kant 
declares, “but to make other people’s judgments the basis determining 
one’s own would be heteronomy” (C, 146). Yet mere autonomy is not 
Kant’s objective. Kant seeks to model a genuine coupling of individual 
experience with the sensus communis, which would require one “(1) 
to think for oneself; (2) to think from the standpoint of everyone else; 
and (3) to think always consistently” (C, 160). Only then might one 
reach an enlightened viewpoint. Even if the recalcitrance of taste has 
value as an index of freedom, taste must nonetheless be transcended—
or, at least, sidestepped—in the movement toward higher modes of 
judgment. Unlike Burke, Kant abandons the synecdoche of taste as a 
term for sensory experiences in general; Kant’s third Critique shows 
little sustained attention to gustatory rather than aesthetic experience. 
In attempting to balance individual autonomy with shared judgment, 
Kant aims to restore human dignity. Kant locates the principles of 
aesthetic experience not in the Creator but rather in the subject—one 
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who can arrive at a sense of mastery over a seemingly infinite world.28 
We would be merely superstitious were we to submit to God out of 
“a feeling of our utter impotence”; we should seek instead “quiet 
contemplation” of the relationship between humanity and the creator 
(C, 122). For a thinker like Milton, the indecipherability of human taste 
raises questions about the relationship between God and humanity: 
humans must negotiate the vagaries of taste in order to deflect an 
impossible decision between a disturbingly sensuous Creator and an 
unknowable one. For Kant, the question of freedom versus judgment 
shifts further toward the way human subjects might interact with one 
another and reach genuinely intersubjective agreement. The most 
important implications of this project lie not in its devotional implica-
tions but rather in its political applications concerning how to evaluate 
human actions and choices.
Kant was unable to articulate a comprehensive political philosophy 
in his later life, but Hannah Arendt has offered her own reconstruc-
tion. Arendt’s elaboration allows us to discern how the question of 
taste persists not merely as a way to describe stubborn individual 
autonomy but rather as a challenge to suture individual freedom with 
external judgment in a tenable political mode. Arendt cites Kant’s 
views on the French Revolution to locate in his thinking “the clash 
between the principle according to which you should act and the 
principle according to which you judge.”29 Kant paradoxically voices 
his appreciation for the Revolution and his disapprobation of the 
actual actors undertaking it. He does so by upholding a split between 
political actors and outside observers: the full meaning of history 
comes into view only for the latter, whereas the actors should not 
have undertaken revolutionary action within their limited viewpoint. 
Arendt finds in aesthetic judgment the crucial possibility of mediating 
between this troubling division. In her reading, the grounds of Kant’s 
political philosophy lie in his third Critique. Arendt notes that the 
“most surprising aspect” of judgment is that it should originally “be 
based on the sense of taste”—a lower sense that gives rise to private 
experiences.30 In moving from taste to aesthetics, Kant describes the 
necessity both of the imagination—whereby objects that are remote 
nonetheless come into view—and the sensus communis of collective 
judgments. These operations, which bring together experience and 
judgment at a remove, hold for Arendt political value, for they allow 
“actor and spectator [to] become united; the maxim of the actor and 
the maxim, the ‘standard,’ according to which the spectator judges 
the spectacle of world, become one.”31 If, in other words, a form of 
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experience originally grounded in individual, embodied caprice can 
genuinely become the basis of judgment, then we can secure the 
grounds of a collective politics of evaluating proper action.
Precisely as a theistic view of universal taste becomes superseded 
by an aesthetic philosophy, Milton’s warnings against seeking a tran-
scendent verdict concerning taste continue to speak proleptically. 
Paradise Lost describes how the split between individual, sensuous 
taste and a higher form of judgment can be sutured, but in such a way 
that preserves a gendered hierarchy rather than wholly overcoming 
it. When Milton’s Adam declares Eve to be exact of taste, he models 
avant la lettre a parodic version of Kantian judgment. The declaration, 
“Eve, now I see thou art exact of taste,” appeals metaphorically to the 
higher sense of sight to cast Adam as an overseer or evaluator of his 
wife; this rhetoric tends to downplay the conspicuous fact that Adam, 
too, has tasted of the fruit. This shift from taste to judgment betrays 
impure motives—Adam’s desire for Eve and his desire to maintain 
mastery over Eve despite his own sinful corporeality. 
At the end of the epic, Milton describes how Adam and Eve (and the 
degrees of sensuousness and judgment that they represent) do become 
unified. Eve remains the object of open-ended interpretation, but it is 
no longer her taste that is at issue. In her final speech, Eve declares 
that God has communicated the message of future salvation in a dream 
whose contents remain unexpressed. It is unclear if Eve is right to 
ascribe her dream to divine inspiration, as the angel Michael explains 
that he himself has calmed Eve with “gentle dreams” (PL, 12.595). 
In this case, however, the impossibility of judging Eve’s experience 
is redemptive. The dream emboldens her to submit to her husband 
but only in a way that maintains some degree of independence. The 
dream has confirmed her own decisive role in redemptive history: “By 
me the promised seed shall all restore,” Eve declares (PL, 12.623). As 
a result, this dream serves as a corrective to the satanic dream that 
raised the possibility of separating from Adam and eating the fruit. 
Adam and Eve exit the poem in a state of oneness and unanimity that 
is at the same time intersubjective, requiring the forms of productive 
conversation that Milton describes as the true meaning of marriage. 
This conclusion sutures female sensuousness and male judgment in 
a rarefied hierarchy. Adam and Eve’s relationship proves an inadequate 
model of intersubjectivity—if not for Kant, then certainly for us now. 
Yet Paradise Lost thereby suggests a way to describe the difficulty 
that Kant and modernity in general confront in establishing a tenable 
universality. Kant strives to correct against biases so that exercising 
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judgment may not amount to assuming a false superiority. Gender 
continues, however, to serve as a privileged metaphor for identifying the 
vexed relationship between the sensuous and the rational. Contrasting 
Kant not with Burke but with Ralph Waldo Emerson, Stanley Cavell 
has described a “masculine/feminine contest over the nature of 
knowing”: Kant’s insistence on active cognition may be metaphorically 
masculine, as opposed to Emerson’s acceptance of sensuous reception 
and intuitions.32 Cavell observes that this dynamic—which is essential 
for and yet “difficult to develop usefully” within his own reading of 
William Shakespeare—manifests itself in the pervasive biblical sense 
of the term “knowing.”33 Milton’s religious poetry reveals (more clearly 
than do Shakespeare’s plays) the channels through which traditional 
or mythic hierarchies persist even when their ideological foundations 
seem to have eroded.
Milton’s poetry is just one of the many conduits through which the 
Judeo-Christian ur-myth of gender relations has been transmitted into 
modern thinking. Yet Paradise Lost is of particular (if not unique) 
relevance to the relationship between the capriciousness of mere 
taste and rational, consensus-building judgment. Milton’s account of 
the Fall, as I have argued, prompts sustained and open-ended ques-
tioning about sensory pleasures in relation to rational choice. In the 
partial absence of a transcendent verdict, the poem gives voice to the 
need for a gendered hierarchy of judgment while also exposing that 
hierarchy as a tenuous enabling fiction. Paradise Lost is thus particu-
larly helpful in locating the religious and cultural histories behind the 
ambivalent relationship between gender difference and Enlightenment 
values. This ambivalence has become a very familiar one. Introducing 
a volume of essays on Kant and feminist thought, Robin May Schott 
describes the divided views of Kant “as having contributed significantly 
to theories of autonomy, subjectivity, and rationality in ways that can 
further feminist projects” or as “a preeminent exponent of patriarchal 
views” who inscribes “gender hierarchies . . . in the very structure of 
his theories of morality and aesthetic judgment.”34 Gayatri Spivak has 
expanded the feminist critique of Enlightenment values by aligning it 
with a critique of other hierarchies of judgment—namely, racial and 
colonialist hierarchies. Yet Spivak openly describes her critique of Kant 
as a “mistaken” reading, placing the term in scare quotation marks to 
suggest that her project is not just oppositional but somewhat ironic.35 
Through the mode of critique (or even of “sabotage,” as she puts 
it), Spivak tests the enduring value of a universalizing vision without 
simply abandoning it.36
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To what extent should we uphold or jettison an Enlightenment 
project of universal values? How does gender remain—in itself as 
well as in dynamic relation to other forms of difference—the site of 
troubling hierarchies of judgment? How might we balance freedom of 
taste and general consensus? These all remain sweeping and important 
questions. By returning to the question of taste in Paradise Lost, this 
essay has sought to uncover one particular strand of the genealogy 
of our views concerning taste in relation to truth and judgment. By 
attending not only to the philosophical but also to the literary and 
religious underpinnings of the way we think about taste, we can 
account for our seemingly inexhaustible conversations about what 
really tastes good and what tastes really good. As our shared gusta-
tory curiosity continues to prove insatiable and becomes ever more 
expansive, we must examine how the desire for good taste has become 
and remains intertwined—for better and for worse—with our search 
for the common good. 
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